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since becoming part of the United States, as have the
French Canadian communities in New England and
across the Great Lakes states. Recognizable border cultures
have flourished, with families that have connections in
both societies. However, passport controls arising out of
security considerations following the terrorist attacks of
9/11, and border restrictions stemming from fears of
immigration violations, may infringe on these easy
movements and informal borderland cultures.
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NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (NAFTA)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
created a free-trade area between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. NAFTA took effect on January 1,
1994. It was the first regional economic integration
agreement between developed and underdeveloped coun-
tries and has since become the world’s largest trading bloc.
Ideologically motivated by the principles of neo-
liberalism, its aims are to facilitate the free movement of
capital in North America by eliminating tariff barriers and
import and export quotas in a similar way to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). However, more controver-
sially, NAFTA’s core provisions also grant foreign
corporations and investors the right to sue a government
over laws and policies that they allege reduce their profits
and promote the privatization and deregulation of
essential services, such as water, energy, and health care.
Despite significant social and environmental con-
sequences resulting from the agreement’s implementation,
judged on its own criteria these aims have largely been
achieved. In the first few years, tariff and nontariff barriers
were removed on 65 percent of goods, although the 1988
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) had already
abolished most tariffs between those two countries.
Although some sensitive industries like agriculture,
energy, and car production were initially exempted from
NAFTA, since 2009 many of these restrictions have been
lifted. The value of regional trade has trebled from $341
billion to $1.1 trillion between 1993 and 2013, and
inward foreign direct investment flows have increased by
five times over the same period and by ten times in
Mexico (Wise 2010).
RATIFICATION
Following several years of negotiations, NAFTA was
signed by the leaders of the three respective nations on
December 17, 1992. Although it then needed to be
authorized by each nation’s legislative or parliamentary
branch, the proposals were strongly opposed by labor
unions, environmental groups, and social movements.
Opposition was especially strong in the United States and
Canada, where following CUFTA, sensitivity to any
further transfer of national sovereignty, which would
weaken domestic labor or environmental standards, was
heightened. The Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART),
Common Frontiers, and the Mexican Action Network
Against Free Trade (RMALC) are examples of coalitions
that emerged in opposition to the agreement in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico respectively (Crow
and Albo 2005, 12–22). Indeed, many American and
Canadian policy makers, businesspeople, and politicians
were concerned that corporations would relocate their
plants to Mexico, where production costs were cheaper,
damaging their own economies and creating unemploy-
ment.
In order to prevent this possibility and also to secure
enough Democrat votes for NAFTA to obtain congres-
sional assent, incoming US president Bill Clinton added
two side agreements: the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),
which provided a baseline for labor costs by reinforcing a
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minimum level of industrial protection for Mexican
workers. These were administered by NAFTA’s Commis-
sion for Labor Cooperation and the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, respectively, and consisted
of a council of ministers and a trinational secretariat.
Although they did not establish harmonized labor and
environmental standards, they did incorporate citizen-
participation mechanisms that enable activists, trade
unions, legal experts, and civil society groups to mount
legal challenges to a third-party adjudicating state’s
national administrative office in cases where the peti-
tioners believe that domestic labor or environmental laws
are being violated.
The NAALC and NAAEC have been dismissed as
ineffective tools for achieving labor and environmental
protection due to their complicated adjudication process-
es, which are open to political manipulation (Adams and
Singh 1997, 161–181). In the case of the NAALC, the
right of assembly, strike, and collective bargaining are not
even subject to binding arbitration, and only child labor,
minimum wage, and health and safety issues are fully
sanctionable. Furthermore, very few cases have been filed
under either NAALC or NAAEC since 1994.
However, in contrast, some of the greatest achieve-
ments that workers and activists have gained have been
through coordinated transnational campaigns that lever-
aged the side agreements. In view of the initial suspicion
and historically protectionist outlooks of the respective
national labor confederations—the AFL-CIO, the
Canadian Labour Confederation, and the Mexican
Workers Confederation, which was tied in to a corporatist
relationship with Mexico’s pro-agreement governments
during the 1990s—these transnational campaigns tended
to be spearheaded by individual unions with more
internationalist perspectives, such as United Electrical in
the United States, the Authentic Workers’ Front in
Mexico, and the Canadian Steelworkers Union. However,
trinational opposition has since expanded as the broader
labor movements in each country were hit by job losses
and falling wages through vehicles like the Tri-National
Solidarity Alliance (Ozarow 2013, 518–520).
IMPACT AND CONTROVERSIES
Most analysts agree that it is difficult to accurately
quantify the changes in trade, investment growth,
Mexican farmers block the El Paso, TX, to Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, bridge, in a 20th-anniversary protest against the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), January 2014. After implementation of NAFTA, Mexico struggled with declining or
barely increasing GDP and wages. Mexican president Carlos Salinas’s policies in compliance with NAFTA requirements led to evictions of
millions of small farmers from their land. AP IMAGES/RAYMUNDO RUIZ
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unemployment, and wages that are directly attributable to
NAFTA. Since the agreement came into effect, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) estimates that economic growth in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico has increased by two-
thirds. However, the US trade gap with Mexico has also
risen dramatically since NAFTA took effect—from a
$4 billion surplus in 1993 to a deficit of $54 billion in
2012 (Glassman 2013). Although corporate profit
margins rose in most industries during that period,
NAFTA also generated adverse effects on employment,
wages, and bargaining power in all three countries by
promoting unrestricted competition between workers.
The agreement’s tariff elimination stipulations have
facilitated the ability of US and Canadian corporations to
shift production and investment to Mexico, a move
further encouraged by weak enforcement of environmen-
tal regulations and labor costs that are ten times lower in
Mexico. Consequently, some 5 million manufacturing
jobs in the United States and Canada have been lost to
Mexico, although the Economic Policy Institute and the
AFL-CIO estimate the number of lost jobs directly
attributable to NAFTA to be approximately 700,000.
Mexican workers were also negatively affected.
Despite promises from the agreement’s architects that
foreign investment would bring unprecedented growth,
Mexico’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
declined in 1995 and barely increased during the first
decade of the twenty-first century. It remained six times
lower than that of the United States in 2010. According to
the International Labour Organization, real Mexican
wages fell by approximately 24 percent between 1995
and 1999, and only returned to pre-NAFTA levels in
2006. Although NAFTA was expected to deliver
“convergence effects,” Mexican wage levels using purchas-
ing power parity indices have remained several times lower
than US equivalents, undermining the bargaining position
of Canadian and American labor. Further, when Mexican
president Carlos Salinas’s neoliberal administration abol-
ished the ejido communal land-holding system (previously
enshrined in the 1917 constitution) in 1991 as part of
pre-NAFTA entry requirements, millions of small farmers
were evicted from their land and forced to migrate to
Mexico’s urban centers. This led to an armed uprising in
the Chiapas region by the Zapatista Army of National
Liberation against the Mexican state on the day that
NAFTA came into force. Import tariffs and subsidies to
domestic enterprises were also removed, leading many
small and medium-sized firms to go bankrupt.
One of the agreement’s main impacts has been the
establishment of thousands of maquiladora factories by
American and Canadian multinationals along Mexico’s
border with the United States (MacDonald 2003, 173),
leading to the creation of export-processing zones. These
multinationals take advantage of Mexico’s lower wage
costs, tax advantages, and lax environmental and labor
regulation to produce goods on a tariff-free basis in low-
skilled plants for assembly, processing, or manufacturing.
They then export the products, sometimes back to the
country of origin of the raw materials. However, there are
major concerns about employment standards in maqui-
ladoras, which mostly employ women.
While it is true that North American governments’
environmental policies have sometimes been neglected in
the wake of trade liberalization, serious NAFTA-related
environmental threats have generally been confined to
border areas like Tijuana, where industrialization has been
most rapid, and to certain sectors, such as metals,
petroleum, and transportation.
As globalization deepens, NAFTA has been used as a
model for subsequent bilateral and multilateral free-trade
agreements, including the proposed Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership in Asia and the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the
United States and the European Union.
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